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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
its enforcement. Furthermore, inasmuch as the section has been
invoked but two times in over ten years, the court finds no abuse of
the method for affecting a resignation under it. Bad faith or
malice on the part of the executive board is also found to be lack-
ing in this instance. Hence, the plaintiff is bound by the constitu-
tion which defines the terms upon which the office of business agent
is held.8
Perhaps, where a provision of the constitution or by-laws can
actually be viewed as violative of public policy,9 or where the ac-
tion of the union or its officers is arbitrary or unreasonable (i. e.
with "malice" or in "bad faith"),10 a judicial tribunal would be
justified in interfering with the internal policies of a labor or-
ganization. Since the courts are not particularly well suited for
such interference however, it is best to allow a union to control
its own affairs in the ordinary instance.
Arbitration
In Bohliger v. National Cash Register Co., the Court of Ap-
peals, in an action by an employer to stay arbitration, was asked
to determine whether an arbitrable issue was raised when two em-
ployees of defendant were discharged for working for a company
in competition with the employer during their off hours. The very
broad arbitration clause in the collective contract read, "Seven-
teenth- In the event of any dispute between the parties hereto
with reference to any matter not provided for in this Contract, or
in reference to the terms, interpretations or application of this
Contract, such disputes shall be referred to a Board of Arbitration
S.1" While the collective contract defines a "discharge,"' 2 it
otherwise fails' to elaborate on the employer's right to discharge
without notice and without cause.
The majority of the court, finding no ambiguity in the lan-
guage of the arbitration clause, holds that the parties contem-
plated the submission to arbitration not only of the terms, appli-
8. Even though a business agent is elected by his local union, the duties and
responsibilities of his position render him a part of the parent union and intermediate
bodies. (Maltese v. Dubinsky, supra note 1 at 456, 108 N. . 2d at 606) Thus plain-
tiff is bound by the "contract" with the International.
9. See Spayd v. Ringling Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113 AtL 70 (1921), where the
court refused to enforce a by-law depriving members of their state constitutional right
to petition the legislature. Note, 35 HAv. L. REv. 332 (1922).
10. See Fleming v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 16 N. J. Mlisc. 502, I Ad. 2d
850. (1938), where a member of defendant union was ordered reinstated because the
real reason for his expulsion was due to his participation in a suit against the union
and not because such member was a year behind in his dues payments.
11. 305 N. Y. 539, 114 N. E. 2d 31 (1953).
12. "[I]n the case of a discharge it is the intent permanently to terminate the
employee's employment.'
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cation, and interpretation of the collective agreement itself, but
also any dispute which might arise in respect of matters not pro-
vided for in the agreement." In other words, the parties intended
to include "any dispute. . with reference to any matter not pro-
vided for in this contract.' ' 4 Thus, arbitration was ordered.
Judge Desmond, dissenting, seems to argue from the theorythat a labor union only has those rights which are specificallygranted by the collective contract and that those not granted are
retained by management. 5 Since the agreement in question places
no restriction on the employer's common-law right to dischargeits employees with or without cause,"8 "there is nothing here to
arbitrate. '17
The parties to a collective agreement are familiar with the
many problems and complexities inherent in the relations which
they are attempting to control through the labor contract. They
therefore realize that it would be impossible to provide in a writteninstrument for every contingency which might arise and that arbi-
tration of disputes is the logical solution to this inability to put
everything down on paper. The majority in the instant case,therefore, has followed the intent of the parties to settle their dis-putes through the arbitration process.
X.- Muqic-A CoPoRATiolqs
Civil Service
The New York Civil Service Law spells out the mandate ofthe New York Constitution requiring that the civil service of the
state and all its civil divisions shall be on the basis of merit andfitness determined as far as practicable by competitive examina-
13. Where the courts are asked to intervene prior to arbitration, they. have heldthat their function is limited to a determination of two questions: 1.) was an agree-ment to arbitrate made, and 2.) has'there been a refusal to arbitrate. Mencher v. B. S.Abeles and Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 590, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 718, 723 (1st Dep't 1948).C P. A. § 1450 provides that the court's function is merely to determine whether "awritten contract providing for arbitration was made. .. and there was a failure to
comply therewith."For an excellent and complete survey of the court's role in regard to labor arbi-tra4on, see Summers, Judicial Reziew of Labor Arbitration, 2 BFro. L. REv. 1 (1952).14. Lipman v. Hauser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76, 80, 43 N. E. 2d 817, 819 (1942).However, the Lipman case concerns a contract for the sale of merchandise and is not
a collective bargaining agreement. The failure of the New York courts to distinguishbetween ordinary and collective contracts has been severely criticized. See Summers,
.rnpra note 13 at 14.15. General Electric Co. v. U. E. P. & M. W. A.-C. L, 0., 196 Misc. 143, 91N. Y. S. 2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1949).16. Watson v. Gugino, 204 N. Y. 535, 541, 98 N. E. 18, 20 (1912) ; Martin v. NewYork Life Insurance Company, 148 N. Y. 117, 121, 42 N. E. 416, 417 (1895).17. This is also the position taken by-the Appellate Division. Bohlinger v. NationalCash Register Co., 280 App. Div. 751, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 46 (1st Dep't 1952).
